Environmental Technology Licensing Under Emission-Equivalent Environmental Taxes and Standards
Ming-Chung Chang*, 1, Jin-Li Hu2
Identifiers and Pagination:Year: 2013
First Page: 14
Last Page: 20
Publisher Id: TOENVIRJ-7-14
Article History:Received Date: 21/03/2013
Revision Received Date: 26/09/2013
Acceptance Date: 26/09/2013
Electronic publication date: 31/10/2013
Collection year: 2013
open-access license: This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License (CC-BY 4.0), a copy of which is available at: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/legalcode. This license permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
We use a two-stage game with an outsider patentee and n homogeneous firms to study the effects of environmental taxes and standards under an equivalent emission on environmental technology licensing behavior. Counter to the intuition, a stricter environmental policy hinders technology licensing since a stricter environmental regulation weakens the licensee's payment ability. When the innovation size is small, there exists a preference inconsistency on the environmental instrument between the government and the patentee. The patent owner has a higher incentive to license under an environmental standard than under an emission tax with an equivalent emission amount.